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ABSTRACT 
This document contains the MSC Safety Office assessment of the Lunar 
Seismic Profiling Experiment (LSPE) which is a part of the Apollo 17 
lunar surface experi ments package. This report provides a description 
of the experiment hardware, the lunar surface procedures for its 
deployment, the tests accomplished in demonstrating its safety, and . 
the safety assessment of the integrated system. 
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1.0 
1.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Purpose and Scope 
The Lunar Seismic Profiling Experiment (LSPE) S-203 is designed to 
generate and detect artifical seismic energy on the lunar surface. 
In accomplishing its task the LSPE utilizes eleven and 1/4 pounds of 
plastic bonded high explosives (Hexanitrostilbene II). An extensive 
evaluation of the experiments components, testing, and procedures has 
been accomplished to insure reduction of hazards .to the crew. This 
report ,provi des the comp leteasses,sment i ncl udi ng ,a descri pti on of 
the hardware, discussion of each mission phase and the safety features 
in use during each, the testing accomplished and a fault tree analysis 
of the experiment. 
2.0 CONCLUS IONS 
The assessment performed and discussed in this report has revealed that 
the LSPE has been satisfactorily designed and tested from a safety 
standpoint. The safety features required by the statement of work to 
the contractor and those ,described in the LSPE specification are 
included in the design. There are no single point fail~res within the 
system which can cause premature detonation of the explosive packages, 
nor are there any inherent safety related problems. Fault tree analyses 
have indicated that after explosive package deployment, a minimum of three 
sequential time limited failures must occur to cause premature detonation 
of a package ~v hi ch coul d effect crew safety. Pri or to deployment a 
minimum of five sequential failures must occur to cause detonation of 
the packages. 
The lunar seismic profiling experiment is coniidered acceptable for 
inclusion in the Apollo 17 ALSEP for transportation to and deployment 
on the lunar surface. 
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3.0 LUNAR SEISMIC PROFILING EXPERI MENT DESCRIPTION 
The Lunar Seismic Profiling Experiment (LSPE) is designed to generate 
and detect artifical seismic energy by use of a four geophone array and 
high explosive detonations of various sizes at various distances from 
the geophon~s. This experiment pe rmits measurement of seismic velocities 
up to a depth of 3 to 4 KM below the lunar surface. From data obtained 
and known velocity-density relationships, information on the internal 
structure and composition of the lunar surface can be determined. 
The LSPE will be transported to the moon in the Descent Stage of the 
Lunar ~~odule(Lfv1 ) on the Apollo 17 mission. Thi's experiment will 
replace the Active Seismic Experi ment (ASE) which was designed to provide 
similar data and was placed on the lunar surface on the Apollo 14 and 
16 missions. 
The LSPE has several advantages over the ASE: (1) A better definition 
of the location of the generated energy, (2) The use of larger charges 
at greater distances, and (3) the use of more charges . 
3. 1 Experiment Hardware 
The LSPE is made up of the following subsystems: (1) c'entral electronics, 
(2) transmit antenna, (3) a geophone array, and (4) eight explosive 
packages. 
3.1.1 Central Electronics 
The central electronics portion of the LSPE is contained in the ALSEP 
central station. This electronics includes an AID convertor , 16 channel 
mUltiplexer, a 41.2 MHz transmitter and amplifier. This electronics 
interfaces with the ALSEP central station, the geophone array and by RF 
link with the individual explosive packages. The transmitter, once 
started by ground command, transmits the signal shown in figure 3.1.1-1 
until ALSEP is taken out of the LSPE mode by earth command. 
The central electronics is put into the LSPE mode by a MSFN command 
which also turns off all other Apollo Lunar Surface Experiment Package 
(ALSEP) experi ments. The LSPE mode provides power to the geophones, 
amplifier, and convertor circuitry to provide a passive listening mode 
but does not turn on the LSPE transmitter. The LSPE transmitter is 
activated by a second MSFN command . This is a ,coded command not stored 
in the MSFN computer until after the LM has lifted off of the lunar 
surface. This eliminates any possibility of inadvertant fire command 
generation. 
The central electronics receives seismic data from the geophone 
array in an analog form which is converted to digital data for 
transmission to earth through the ALSEP down link transmitter. 
3.1.2 LSPE Transmit Antenna 
The LSPE transmitter in the central electronics is connected by coaxial 
cable to a 60 + 3 inch tall transmit antenna. The antenna will be 
deployed using the heat flow experiment pallet as its base. To eliminate 
interference with the ALSEP up and down links, this antenna will be 
placed a minimum of 40 feet from the central station. 
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3.1.3 Geophone Array 
The LSPE geophone array is made up of four geophones identical to those 
used on the Active Seismic Experi ment. The geophones are stored for 
transportation in a geophone module which also carries flags used in 
the photography of the array following deployment. The geophones are 
deployed on the lunar surface during Extravehicular Activity (EVA) I 
by the astronaut using the Universal Hand Tool (UHT). The array forms 
an equilateral triangle 300 feet on a side with one geophone at each 
angle and one in the center. The array will be deployed near the other 
ALSEP '-h'ardware as indicated in fi gure3. 1.3-1. 
The purpose of the geophones is to detect the seismic disturbance 
generated by the explosive package detonation and transfer that data 
to the central electronics for transmission to earth. The arrangement 
will allow determination of strength and direction of the disturbance. 
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3.1.4 Explosive Packages 
A total of eight explosive packages (EP\s) will be used in this 
experi me nt. The expl osive material used in these packages is 
Hexanitrostilbene II (HNS II) bonded with Teflon in a ratio of 
90/10. The exp losive we ights in these packages are, l/B, liB, 1/4, 
1/4, 1/2, 1, 3, anD 6 pounds of high explosive material. The high 
explosive (H NS II) is discussed in paragraph 3. 1.4 . B. 
The package is provided with an externally mo unted receive antenna 
atta-ched to the two halve's of theexp1 osi ve package. The top ha 1f 
of the package is the Electronics and Safe/Arm Assembly (E&SA). 
The E&SA consists of (1) electronics (RF receiver, signal processor 
and pulse code generator), (2) a thermal battery, (3) an end-
detonating- cartridge (EDC), (4) two mechanical timers, one to control 
the safe/arm slide and one to activate the thermal battery, and 
(5) four safety pull pins, all of which are mounted on an aluminum 
baseplate. 
The bottom half of the explosive package is a nickel-plated fiberglass 
housing wh ich contains the HNS II explosive block. In ~ll cases, 
except for the 6 pound charge the block is held in place in the 
housing by a foam retainer. 
Each of the exp losive packages are identical except for the weight 
of the explosive block and the preset runout ti me of the two 
mechanical timers. Figure 3.1.4-1 is an illustration of an LSP 
explosive package. Figure 3.1.4-2 provides a functional block 
diagram. The following paragraphs discuss each of the explosive 
package components. 
3.1.4.1 Receive Antenna 
The receive antenna for the explosive package is an extendable section-
a1ized whip type antenna mounted externally to the main body of the 
package in the package handle. The antenna is 60 inches in length 
and requires a maximum of six pounds of force to extend any of the 
11 sections. The antenna for the large EP (6 pound) is provided 
with a matching network. This is to insure that the transmitted 
signal from the transmit antenna some 2.4 kilometers away is detected. 
It was determined by tests that the closer charges required no such 
ante~na matching. 
3.1.4.2 El ectroni cs 
The explosive package electronics consists of an RF receiver, 
signal processor and fire pulse generator. The receiver accepts 
the 41.2 MHz signal from the central electronics when the thermal 
battery has provided powe r for the .receiver and firing circuit. 
The receiver passes detected signals to the signal processor 
which decodes the signal and inturn discharges the fire pulse 
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(RF Commend) 
generator. If the safe/ann slide is in the "ARM" position at that time 
the firing pulse capacitor output is sent to the end-detonating-cartridge. 
The pulse code generator is provided with a bleed-down circuit which 
will cause the firing capacitor to lose it's charge approximately 
90 seconds after the thermal battery ceases to function. 
3.1.4.3 Thermal Battery 
The thermal battery (figure 3.1.4-3) provides power in the form of 
24 VDC, 13 VDC, and 5 VDC to the EP electronics. The battery is inert 
until the thermal battery timer allows the firing pin to strike the pyro 
fuse . The ,fuse t-t;.0. in ,runs thr.oug.h .the center of tbe battery and 
ignites heat pellets which melt and become one side of the battery celT. 
The heat in turn melts the bimetal pellet which becomes the other 
side of the battery cell. These two liquids are separated by the DEB 
pellet. The current flows as the electrode gathers electons. The 
temperature \",ithi n the battery reaches approximately 1 ,0000F. Th i swill 
cause the external temperature of the package near the battery to 
reach approximately 2350 . The EMU will withstand temperatures in 
excess of 2500. Therefore activation of the the nnal battery prematurely 
will not in itself cause a hazard to the crew. The battery life is a 
minimum of 60 seconds and a maxi mum of 3.0 minutes during this period 
the battery allows the electronics to function. After the battery 
has lost its usable life and the capacitor has been bled down the 
explosive package is no longer able to detonate. The battery is sealed 
in a dry room atmosphere and has a shelf life of 3 to 5 years. 
3.1.4.4 End Detonating Cartridge 
The end detonating cartridge (EDC) is the first component in the 
explosive package explosive train. The EDC is a standard Apollo 
detonator selected from a lot purchased for the Apollo program . . The 
EDC's are designeq not to fire under 1 amp, 1 watt conditions for five 
minutes and for positive firing for 5 amps, 5 watts for .005 seconds. 
The auto ignition temperature is 600oF. 
The EDC is mounted in the package so as to be directly over the center 
of the exp losive block. The detonator is shorted until the safe/arm 
slide is moved to the "ARM" position at which time the short is removed 
and the output of the firing pulse generator connected to the EDC. 
3.1.4.5 Safe/Arm Slide 
The safe/arm slide is one of the pri me safety devices within the 
explosive package. The slide (shown in figure 3.1.4-4) is made of 
hardened 17-4 stainless steel. The slide is initially in the "SAFE" 
position with the RTV 21 filled depression in one end of the slide in 
direct line with the EDC. Firing of the EDC at this ti me will not cause 
detonation of the high explosive block (see paragraph 5.2 fo~ test data). 
The slide position is controlled by one of the two mechanical timers in 
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the package. When that timer runs to its preset arm time the slide, 
pulled by springs, is allowed to move to the "ARW position. This 
places the center of the slide directly under the EDC. The center of 
the slide has a hole comp letely through the hardened stee l with an 
explosive lead of HNS filling the hole. The slide is held in this 
position until the EDC is fired or until two ho~rs have passed, at which 
time the me chanical ti me r allows the springs to move the slide to the 
IIRESAFE" position.' The resafe portion under the EDC provides the 
same safety as the initial safe position (See figure 3.1.4-4). 
,Attached to the sa{e/a'rm .slide is a filler glass arm vvhich extends 
through a slot in the top of the explosive package. This arm, when used 
with the painted marks on the package top, provides the crew with a 
positive indication of the slide position C1SAFE", "ARM", or "RESAFE"). 
To prohibit dust from entering the EP through the indicator slot, a 
clear bubble was placed over the indicator. 
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3.1.4.6 Mechanical Timers 
The explosive packages each contain two totally separate mechanical 
timers. These ti mers control activation of the thermal battery and 
movement of the safe/arm slide. The timers are manufactured by the 
Bulova Watch 'Company and have gone through modifications and design 
changes over the last two years to reach the present configuration 
(see figures 3.1.4-5 and 3.1.4-6). These changes were necessitated by 
the' problems encountered during engineering and prototype testing of the 
original design. The present timer is a direct drive configuration using 
the output from the hour hand of a mi 1 i tary hack\'.Jatch movement through 
reduction gears to turn a drum. In ~he drum is a slot through which 
the actuating arms of the assembly will fall when the timer times out (see figures 3.1.4-5 and 3.1.4-6). ' 
The design incorporates the largest watch movement that space and 
weight restrictions allows. This movement is the Bulova military hack 
watch, which is produced in large nu mb ers for use in military wrist 
watches and confo nns to MIL-W-3B1B (superseded by Federal Specification 
GG-W-113A). It has a jewelled pallet, detach lever, mechanical escape-
ment movement and an overcoiled hairspring. It is ruggedized for 
military service, but is otheY'\t-Jise typical of high quality horologica1 
practice. The term "hack watch II derives from the design feature which 
stops the movement when the winding stem is pulled out and starts again 
when the stem is depressed. This feature is utilized in the timer 
application by allowing the watch to be started by removal of a safety 
pull-pin. The motion of the pull-pin through a yoke arrangement 
depresses the stem, starting the watch. 
It was necessary to modify the 24-hour watch mechanism to provide at 
least 95 hours running time, with suitable margin. This was 
accomplished by incorporating an auxiliary mainspring and mainspring 
barrel in series with the normal watch mainspring and a slightly 
revised framework to house the parts. This arrangement leaves the 
basic watch movement unchanged, thereby not degrading its normal 
high reliability (see figure 3.1.4-7). 
The watch movement and the remainder of the control assembly are 
sealed and backfilled to a slight overpressure with dry nitrogen, plus 
helium as a tracer for leak rate testing. This is required for several 
reasons. One is to provide an inert environment .for the watch lubricant 
to prevent oxidation or gumming during storage periods. The other 
reasons are to prevent possible evaporation of the lubricant in the lunar 
environment, and to prevent the effects of low pressure from changing 
the balance wheel amplitude (the effect of low pressure is discussed in 
paragraph 5.1). Sealing of the units is accomplished by gasket o-ring 
seals on the control housing, the winding/setting shaft and the hourhand 
shaft. 
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The ti me rs are preset prior to the mission ta run out in one hour incre-
ments of from 90 to 95 hours. The safe/arm timer in each explosive 
package is set for its initial timeout one hour prior to the thermal 
battery timer setting. The accuracy of the timers is plus or minus 
27 minutes over their running period. 
3.1.4.6.1 Safe/Arm Timer 
The safe/arm timer controls the position of the safe/arm slide. This 
timer restrains the position of the slide in the safe condition from 
assembly until timeout of the ti me r 90 to 93 hours after the astronaut 
pulls the timer safety pins at deployment. At timeout the timer removes 
the restraint and allows the slide to move to the IIARMII position. The 
timer continues to run and if the patkage has not detonated prior to two 
hours after being armed the ti mer then removes additional restraints and 
the slide moves to the IIRESAFE" position (see figures 3.1.4-4 and 
3.1.4-5). 
3.1.4.6.2 Thermal Battery Timer 
The second timer in the explosive packages controls the time that the 
thermal battery is activated. This timer restrains the thermal battery 
firing pin until the ti me out of the timer 91 to 94 hours after the-
astronaut pulls the timer saf€ty pins at deployment. At time out the 
spring loaded firing pin portion of the timer assembly is released and 
strikes the thermal bettery activating it and making the explosive package 
an active system (see figure 3.1.4-6). 
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3.1.4.7 Safet,YPull Pins 
Each explosive package has as part of the safety features four pull 
pins. These pins are removed by the astronaut at deployment in a pre-
planned order by use of three pull rings on top of the explosive packages 
(see figure 3. 1.4-1). 
The two mechanical timers are started at the time of deployment by 
removal of separate -pU ll- pins . Another pull - pin constrains the safe/ 
arm slide in its IISAFE II position, as a safety backup to the safe/arm 
slide ti me r. A fourth pull- pin cont9-ined \>Iithin the thermal battery timer 
constrains the firing pin from activating the battery and provides safety 
backup in the event the thermal battery ti mer prematurely functions. 
Each pin is constrained by a retaining spring force which must be over-
come by the astronaut during removal. In addition, the safe/arm slide 
pull-pin requires rotation before it can be removed; each action is 
constrained by a retain ing spring force (see figure 3.1.4-8). 
At deployment the first pin removed starts the safe/arm timer. Up 
until this point any inadvertant start of the ti mer will be halted by 
this pin. The pin is designed so that if the ti mer prematurely starts, 
the pin cannot be removed; 
The second pin removed during deployment is one which extends through 
the safe/arm slide and pins it in place. If for any reason the safe/arm 
timer restrai nt we re removed from the slide. the pin wou ld not allow the 
slide to move to t he lIA RI"1 11 position. Under this condition the pin cannot 
be removed from the exp losive package. Exerting additional force on this 
pin will cause the pin to shear at a point which will leave the portion 
holding the slide in place. 
The third and fourth safety pins are removed by a single astronaut action 
at deployment. One start s the thennal battery timer, the other removes a 
safety block of the therulal battery firing pin. The thermal battery timer 
safety pin, like that in the safe/a rm timer, will stop the mechanism if it 
prematurely starts and cannot be remov ed under that condition. Likewise, 
if for any reason the timer restraints are removed from the thermal 
battery firing pin, its safety pin will prohibit battery activation and 
that pin could not be removed. 
The order in wh i ch the pu 11 pi ns are removed duri ng deployment was 
directed by t he Safety Office and provides for the safest condition 
under potential failure modes. As an additi ona l safety precaution the 
MSC Safety Office required the safe/arm slide pull pin be designed so 
that the ring must be rotated before the pin can be removed. 
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3.1.4.8 Hexanitrostil bene II (H NS' II) 
The high exp losives us ed in the explosive packages are a blend of 
Hexanitro st il bene II and Teflon in a r atio of 90 to 10 percent. The 
HNS II i n pur e f orm is approxima t e ly 15% more powerful t han TNT. By 
the bondi ng process wi t h t eflon t o the 90/10 ratio the perweight output 
of the LSPE charges wi ll be app roximately equ al to that of TNT. One 
pound of the explosive provides a fo r ce at detonation of approximately 
1,513,000 foot-pounds. 
HNS II was selected for use in t his experi ment for several reasons, the 
most imp ortant bei ng safety. As de te rmined by tests, mostly accomplished 
at the Naval Ordnance Labo ratory (NOL), pure HNS II has been found to 
have very low sensitivity to shock, temperatu re and electrostatic sparks. 
The following are some examples of the insensitivity to shock: 
A. Pure HNS II (more sensitive th an the HNS/teflon used in LSPE) was 
impacted by a 20mm shell and failed to detonate. 
B. NOL tests on naval hardware con t aining HNS II has been dropped 
from hei ghts of 40 f eet and the exp losives did not detonate. The 
hardwa re was dis assembled, th e exp los i ve examined and then purposely 
detonat ed to determi ne any change in detonation velocity - no change 
was noted. NOL estimates that the explosi ve saw 20,000 G i S on 
impact. 
C. One of the LSPE explosive blocks was inadvertantly dropped at NOL 
from a height of four feet. A corner was broken off but the block' 
did not detonate . 
D. During NOL no fire tests and confirmation of the safe/arm slide, 
several slides wi t h ma nufacturing defects were coi ned out by the end 
detonating cartridge. The coin from the slide was embedded in the 
explosive block which did not detonate (see paragraph 5.2). 
Temperature has little effect on the makeup of HNS II. The auto 
ignition temperature is above 600oF. NOL tests have demonstrated that 
HNS II held at 5400F for 12 hours will not igni.te. Tests have been run 
by the NOL where HNS II was subjected to 4600F for seven days with no 
change in characteristics. The same is true when subjected to a 
temperature of -3l50 F (See Reference 9). 
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Tests have shown that HNS II will not fire from electrostatic spark 
generated by less than 0.0001 MFD at 17,000 volts (See Reference 9). 
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3.2 . Lunar Modul e Stowage 
During the flight to the lunar surface the LSPE is divided into two 
areas for stowage on the lunar module (see fi gure 3. 2-1). The geophone 
array and transmit antenna wil l be stowed in the scientific equipment 
bay as part of ALS EP subpackage number 1 (see figure 3.2-2). 
The eight explosive packages will be stowed in quad III. The packages 
will be mounted to two shock mounted transport frames (see figure 
3.2-3) . 
The transport frames provide a positive retainer for the explosive 
package .pull pins by app lying positive pressure to the top of the pins. 
3.3 Lunar Surface Transportation 
On the lunar surface the geophone mod ule and transmit antenna are 
transported t o the ALSEP deployment site still attached to sub-
package number 1. The explosive packages will be transpor ted to 
their deployment si tes attached to the transport frame on the aft of the 
LRV (see figure 3.3-1). The fr ame provides the same positive pressure 
on the explosive package pull pins as during the period in the LM. 
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3.4 LSPE Deployment 
Present planning for deployment of the LSPE on Apollo 17 is as 
follows: 
The geophone array and transmit antenna will be deployed during the 
initial portion of EVA I, as will the other ALSEP subsystems (see figure 
3.l.3-1). Following deployment of the geophone array, the downlink will 
be used to verify that the ALSEP is iii the LSPE mode. An uplink command 
will then transfer the ALSEP out of the LSPE mode and be confirmed by down-
link data . Upon this cOlifirmati on "o'f sys'tem operation, t he central 
station LSPE switch vv ill be left in the "ON" position. Safety 
justification for accepting this condition is provided in Appendix A. 
The explosive packages wil l be deployed at the points indicated on 
figures 3.4-1 and 3.4-2; the first three on EVA I, starting wi th the 
1 pound charge on the first LRV traverse to station nu mbe r 1. Figure 
3.4-3 indicates the timeline for LSPE associated activities including 
deployment and detonation. 
The procedure for deployment of all packages w]ll be, for the most part, 
identical. 
1. The astronaut will observe the safe slide indicator. If it indicates 
IISAFE II he vJill proceed, if it indicates IIARW he will discontinue 
dep 1 oyme nt procedures for that package and imme di ate ly abandon it, 
being sure that the pull pins on ring number 3 are fully inserted 
into the package. 
2. Pull ring number 1. 
3. Observe safe/arm slide position indicator. 
4. Rotate and pull ring number 2. 
5. Observe safe/arm slide position indicator. (abandon EP if slide moved) 
6. Pull ring Number 3 (two pull pins). 
7. Observe safe/arm slide position indicator. (abandon EP if slide moved) 
8. Deploy the receive antenna ~nd place the package on the lunar 
surface. 
In some cases the package will be deployed \vithout the astronaut leaving 
the LRV. This will be done when the desired deployme nt site is at a 
location not defined as a science stop. In these cases the explosive 
package wi 11 be removed from the transport frame at the stop just prior 
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to the desired deployment location and held by the LMP until the LRV 
navigation system indicates the desired location. The CDR will position 
the vehi cl e so as to allow deployment of the packag e without the 
possibility of hitting it as he drives away. To prevent hooking of 
explosive package pull ri ngs and damage to the explosive package during 
unstowed handling) the following constraints have been defined. 
1. 'The as tronaut may not ingress/egress the LRV whil e carrying the 
EP. 
'2. The handle of the EP must be grasped 'and the package supported in 
the right hand crewman1s lap during all LRV traverses in which the 
EP is unstowed. 
3. The unstowed EP may not be put down for oth'er operations during 
traverse or at stops during traverse. 
4. No other operations may be performed by the astronaut supporting 
the EP. 
5. Only one EP at a time may be handled in this manner. 
As seen in figure 3.4-2 the initial explosive package deployed on EVA I 
will be passed by the crew on the LRV during their return to the LM. 
Concern was expressed that the LRV might possibly run over or into that 
package on the return traverse. An action item was assigned at the 
July 19, 1972 Apollo 17 Mission Review to look into that potential 
problem. Appendi x B contains a copy of the memorandum closing the 
action item and explaining why this is not considered a hazard to the 
crew. Please note that since the memorandum was prepared the explosive 
package and EVA in question has changed. This has no impact on the 
rationale provided . 
Subsequent to the transmittal of that memorandum the preliminary 
Lunar Surface Procedures and Flight Plan were released and are presently 
being reviewed by Safety. Comments concerning the procedures relative 
to LRV explosive package deployment and precautions discussed in the 
Appendix B memorandum will be provided to the appropriate offices. 
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3.5 LSPE System Operation 
The following paragraphs provide a description of the proper operation 
of the LSPE system. 
1. During deployment of the explosive packages the four safety pull 
pi ns are removed, vJhi ch starts both ti mers and removes the safety 
blocks from the safe/arm (s/ a) slide and the thermal battery 
firing pin. 
2. Approximately one hour before the s/a ti mers are scheduled to 
runout, the MSFN command putting the ALSEP in the LSPE mode, and the 
command to the LSPE transmitter·to start sending the fire code are 
initiated. 
3. Upon receipt of those two commands the central electronics begins 
transmission of the LSPE fire code (figure 3.1.1-1). 
4. At the end of the s/a timer period (90, 91, 92 or 93 hours + 27 
minutes depending upon the EP), the slide will move to the "TrARW 
position. This provides a firing path for the EDC and also removes 
the EDC short. 
5. At the end of the thermal battery timer peri od (91 , 92, 93 or 94 
hours + 27 minutes depending upon the EP), the thermal battery firing 
pin is-released and impacts the battery pyrofuse activating the 
battery and closing the battery switch to the EP pulse code genera-
tor (capacitor) (see figure 3. 1.4~2). 
6. The thermal battery generates power which is supplied to the RF 
receiver, the si gnal processor, and th~ pulse code generator. 
7. The pulse code generator capacitor is charged. 
8. The RF signal is received by the EP and decoded by the signal 
processor. The proper signal causes the switch to close and 
discharge the capacitor into the EDC. (Specified life of the 
battery is 1.5 to 3.0 minutes requiring that the RF signal be 
received within 1.5 minutes of battery activation to insure 
acceptance.) 
9. The EDC is detonated which inturn detonates the explosive lead 
in the s/a slide and it detonates the HNS II explosive block. 
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10. If for any reason the package does not detonate, then two hours 
after the s/a slide moved to the IlARMIl position it is released 
by the ti mer and moves to the IlRESAFE Il position. 
A summary of the above information is provided in a logic form in figure 
3.5-1. 
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4.0 SAFETY ASSESSMENT 
Because of the almost certain catastrophic effects of premature detonation 
of the LSPE exp los i ve packages, the safety of the experiment Itlas the 
major consideration in design. To insure .that the safety requirements 
were met and that each potential problem \"ias evaluated from a safety 
standpo int, the System Safety Office participated in the design, 
modification , and testing of the hardware and in the preparat ion of 
operational and test procedures. Safety has participated in all 
milestone revi ev/s and safety related 'testinq. . 
In addition to this activity a speci.al safety comm ittee was created to 
monitor the exper iment. Members of that committee were from the following 
NASA/MSC organizations: 
Lunar Experiments Project Office 
Safety Office 
Reliability and Quality Assurance 
Apollo Spacecraft Program Office 
Propulsion and Power Division 
Flight Crew Operations Division 
This comm ittee's concurrence-is required on all safety-related aspects of 
the experi ment. 
As a continuing effort throughout the program, a detailed safety 
assessment for the LSPE has been performed. The safety assessment 
included a review of the hardware design, test data, planned lunar sur.face 
activities, and crew interface. To evaluate the experiment for potential 
hazards of the integrated hardware/procedures, the Apollo 17 mission was 
divided into three basic phases. The potential failures during those 
phases and the safety features related to those failures were examined. 
The mission phases chosen for this study were (1) predeployment of the 
explosive packages, LM stowage through LRV transport to the deployment 
sites, (2) explosive package deployment and (3) post explosive package 
deployment . The safety features incorporated into the LSPE by design and 
the characteristics of the high explosives used in the explosive packages 
and discussed in section 3 are summarized in figure 4.0-1. 
A detailed fault tree was prepared on the design to verify that no 
single failure points existed. This fault tree is provided in figure 
6.0-1, pages 66 through 71. 
The worst case failures for the three mission phases were incorporated 
into the fault tree to provide a simplified tree for each of those three 
phases (figures 6.0-2, 6.0-3, and 6.0-4). 
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MISSION PHASE VS. SAFETY FEATURES 
MISSION PHASE 
LM STOWAGE - PRELAUNCH, 
LAUNCH BOOST, TRANSLUNAR 
COAST, LU NAR LANDING, LUNAR 
ROVING VEHICLE TRANSPORT 
o 
SAFETY FEATURES IN EFFECT 
SAFETY PINS ENGAGED (FOUR PINS) 
o TI MERS PI NNEO IN NON-RUNNING CONDITION (PINS CANNOT 
BE REMOVED IF TIMERS HAVE SELF-START ED ) 
o SAFE/ARM SLIDE PINNEO IN SAFE POSITI6N (TESTS HAVE ~HOWN 
THAT THE EDC FI RING INTO THE SLIDE IN THE SAFE OR RESAFE 
POSITION WILL NOT CAUSE DETONAT ION OF THE EXPLOSIVE BLOCK) 
o TH ERMAL BATTERY FIRING PINNED IN SAFE CONDITION 
o . THE RMAL BATTERY OUTPUT OPEN CIRCUITED .UNTIL THE BATTERY 
FIRING PIN MOVES , 
o END DETONATING CARTRIDGE SI ~ORTED UNTIL SLIDE IS MOVED 
TO THE ARM POSI TION 
o SAFE/ARM SLIDE PIN IS PROVIDE~ WITH POSITIVE SECONDARY 
RETAINER (MUST BE ROTATED TO BE REMOVED) 
o EACH EXPLOSIVE PACKAGE IS PROVIDED WITH BACKUP SAFETY 
PIN RETAINERS ATTACHED TO THE PALLET 
o MSFN COMMAND IS REQUIRED TO FIRE EXPLOSIVE PACKAGE (FIRE 
COMMAND CODE I~ NOT STORED IN THE GROUND TRANSMITTER UNTIL 
AFTER LM LIFTOFF FROM THE LU NAR SURFACE} 
o HIGH EXPLOSIVE (HNS II) IS INSENSITIVE TO PHYSICAL SHOCK 
Q AUTO IG NI TION TEMPE RATURE OF THE HIGH EXPLOSIVE IS GREATER 
THAN 540°F 
o TESTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED EDC IS INSENSITIVE TO RFI 
FIGURE 4.0-1 
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MISSION PHASE 
o EXPLOSIVE PACKAGE 
DEPLOYMENT 
SAFETY FEATURES IN EFFECT 
o MSFN COMMAND REQUIRED TO FIRE EACH EXPLOSIVE 
PACKAGE (GROUND INITIATED FIRE CODE IS NOT 
STORED IN THE TRANSMITTER UN TIL AFTER LUNAR 
LIFTOFF) 
o SAFETY PINS ARE PULLED IN A SEQUENCE \'iHE REBY 
THE SAF E/ARM SLIDE POSITION IND ICATOR CAN BE 
OBSERVED AFTER ITS SAFETY PIN HAS BEEN PULLED 
BUT BEFORE THE TH ERt'1AL BflTTERY SAFETY PIN IS 
REMOVED. THIS ' ALL OWS THE EXP LOSIVE PAC KAG E 
TO BE ABANDONED WITH TWO SAFETY PI NS ENGAG ED 
AND T}-IE PACKAGE SAFE IF THE SLIDE HAS l'lOV ED 
TO THE ARMED POSITION. 
o n~o INDIVIDUAL TI MERS - 80TII MUST RUN 90 PLUS 
HOURS BEFORE THE FOLLmJHlG ~;AFETY FEATURES 
ARE REr~OVED : 
o SAFE/ARM SLIDE IN SAF ~ PJSITION 
o THERMAL BATTERY INERT" 
o TH ERMAL BATTERY OUTPUT OPEN CIRCUITED 
o END DETO NATING CARTRIDGE SHORTED 
o I HIGH EXP LOSI VE .(HNS II) IS INSENSITIV ~ TO 
PHYSIC AL SHOCK 
o AUTO IGNITIO~ TEMPERATURE OF THE HIGH EXPLOSIVE 
IS GREATER THAN 5400 F 
o TESTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE EDC IS INSENSITIVE 
TO RFI 
FIGURE 4.0-1 (continued) 
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MISSION PHASE 
o POST DEPLOYMENT 
SAFETY FEATURES -IN EFFECT 
o TWO INDIVIDUAL TI MERS - BOTH MUST RUN 90 HOURS 
OR MORE BEFORE THE FOLLOWING SAFETY FEATURES 
ARE REr~OV ED: 
o SAFE/ARM SLIDE IS IN THE SAFE POSITION 
o THE RMAL BATTERY IS INERT 
o THERr~AL BATTERY OUTPUT OPEN CIRCUITED 
o END DETONATING CARTRIDGE SHORTED 
o MS FN COMMAN D REQUIRE D TO FI RE EAC H EXPlOSIVE 
PAC KAGE (EA RTH INITIATED LSPE FI RE C or~~lAND 
CODE IS NOT STORED IN TRANSMITTER UNTIL AFTER 
LM LIFTOFF) 
o AUTO IGNITION TEMPERATURE OF THE HIGH EXPLOSIVE 
. IS GREATER THAN 5400 F 
o TESTS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT THE tDC IS INSENSITIVE 
TO RFI 
NOTE: SAFETY MARGIN BETWEEN LM LIFTOFF AND FIRST 
TIME RUN OUT FOR THE INITIAL EXP LOSIVE 
PACKAGE DEPLOYED IS APPROXIMATELY 24 HOURS. 
FIGURE 4.0-1 (continued) 
The following ' paragraphs describe those worst case failures for each 
of the three phases and the rationale for accepting those potential 
failures in considering the experiment an acceptable risk for the 
Apollo 17 mission. 
4. 1 Predeployment 6f Explosive Packages 
During the period the explosive packages are stowed in the LM or are 
being transported to their deployme nt sites, a minimum of five 
. sequent i al t ,i, me- 1 i mi ted fa i lures mus t occur t o ,cause premat ur.e detona-
tion . Each failure is within the explosive package and listed below: 
(1) Faflure of the safe/arm timer slide retaining mechanism. This 
failure could be the result of a structural failure of anyone of 
the following components: 
arming pin 
actuator 1 ever 
release cam 
. timing drum 
(see figure 3.1.4-5) 
(2) Safe/arm s"ide safety pin failure. 
The stainless steel pin is held in place by a spring loaded ball 
plunger and normally has no shearing load applied to it. Failure 
(1) above will cause the safe/arm slide to exert a force of 
approximately one pound on the pi~ (insufficient to cause shearing). 
Tlie mos t 1 ike ly fai 1 ure in thi s area woul d be the loss of the safety 
pin due to vibration. This is, however, very unlikely. The pull. 
ring must be rotated 2700 before the pin can be removed. Also, whlle 
the packages are connected to the trans~o~t frame, all ~afety pins 
are held in place by the secondary retalnlng pad (see flgure 
3.2-3). 
If both of the failures described in (1) and (2) above occur, the 
safe/arm slide would move to the "ARW position~placing the explosive 
lead directly under the end detonating cartridge (EDC) and removing 
the EDC short. 
(3) Thermal battery timer firing pin retaining mechanism failure. 
This failure could be the result of a structural failure of any of 
the following components: 
actuator 1 ever 
locking lever 
. ti mi ng drum 
(see figure 3.1.4-6) 
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(4) Thermal battery firing pin safety pin failure. 
This stainless steel pin is held in place by a spring clamp and 
normally has no shearing force applied to it. If failure (3) 
occurs, the spring loaded firing pin exerts a force of 15 pounds on 
the saf~ty pin. This force is far below that required to shear 
the safety pin. Again, the more likely failure would be loss of 
the subject pin. This too is extremely unlikely. The thermal 
battery safety pi n does not require any rotation to remove; however, 
with the explosive package attached t o the transport frame, the pins 
are held in place by the secondary retaining pad. 
Failures (3) and '(4) above will activate the thermal battery. The 
thermal batte ry as described in paragraph 3.1.3 . 3 ,has a life of 1.5 
to 3.0 minutesJduring which ti me the RF receiver is powered up and 
the firing capacitor is charged. The firing ci rcuit is provided 
with a bleed dovin network whi ch causes the capacitor to lose its 
charge approximately 1.5 minutes after the thermal battery loses 
power. Because of these facts, the failures activating the battery 
must occur no more than 4.5 minutes before the safe/arm slide moves 
to the arm position and before failure (5) occurs. Otherwise the 
capacitor will have no power to fire the EDC even if the other 
hypothesized failures do occur. 
(5) Firing Circuit Failure 
This failure could be the result of a failure in the decoder or a 
short in the silicon control rectifier swi t ch. This failure 
must occur within 4.5 minutes after failures (3) and (4) because of 
the limited life of the battery and the capacitor bleed down 
circuit described above. This failure cannot occur before the 
thermal battery is activated. If the fa i lure occurs before the 
capacitor is charged, the capacitor output would be connected to the 
EDC,allowing the current to flow through the EDC instead of into 
the capacitor. The capacitor would never reach a charged condition 
and the current flow through the EDC would be insufficient to detonate 
the cartridge (see paragraph 3.1.3.4). 
From the information above it can be seen that the five failures must 
occur in a sequenti al and time limited manner where the firing switch 
closes between 0.5 and 4.5 minutes after the thermal battery is activated 
and after the safe/arm slide moves to the "ARM" position but at no other 
time. Figure 4.1-1 provides a summary of the failures and conditions 
which must be met to cause detonation .. 
Tests have been run at MSC to verify that radio frequency interference 
will not cause the end detonating cartridge to detonate (see paragraph . 
5.4) . 
Based on the number, sequence, types of failures, the limited time in 
which they must occur to cause premature detonation of an explosive 
package, and the characteristics of the high explosives (HNS II), the 
LSPE is considered acceptable for transport to their deployment sites. 
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FAILURES WHICH MUST OCCUR AND CONDITIONS WHICH MUST BE MET 
TO CAUSE PREMATURE EP DETONATION BEFORE DEPLOYMENT 
( 1 ) 
Slide retaining 
mechan ism failure(s) 
o Must occur in 
conjunction with 
fail ure (2) 
(2) 
Slide safety pin 
failure 
o Must occur in 
conjunct ion with 
fail ure (1) 
o Combi nati on wi 11 cause safe arm sl i de to 
move to the "ARM" position. 
o Must occur before or within 4.5 minutes 
after thermal battery activation. 
(Failures (3) and (4)) 
(3) 
Thermal battery 
retaining mechanism 
fail ure (s) 
o Must occut in 
conjunction with 
fail ure (4) 
(4) 
Thermal battery 
safety pin 
failure 
o Must occur i A 
conjunction ~ith 
failure (3) 
o Combi nati on wi 11 acti vate the rmal 
battery. 
o Must occur after or no more than 4.5 
minutes before the slide moves to the 
"A RM" position. 
o Must occur before but within 4.5 minutes 
of failure (5). 
FIGURE 4.1-1 
J5} 
Firing circuit 
failure 
o Must occur wh ile 
the slide is in 
the "ARM" position 
o Must occur between 
.5 and 4.5 minutes 
after the the nna l 
batte ry is 
activated . 
o If failure occurs 
before the firing 
capacitor is 
charged the EDC 
. cannot be fired. 
... 
4.2 Explosive ' Package ' Deployment 
During deployment of the explosive packages, as described in 
paragraph 3.4, the crew wi ll sequentially remove four safety pins from 
each package. The removal of the second pin, the safe/arm slide safety 
pi n, reduces the number of fail ures requi r,ed to cause detonati on of an 
explosi ve package to fo ur. Those failures are ident ical to failures 
(1), (3), (4), and (5) discussed in the predeployment phase of the 
mission. The reduction of the number of failures required to cause 
detonation does not significantly increase the hazard to the crew. 
Figure 4. 2-·l 'prov ides asurnmcrry 'of the fai'l ures anti conditions which 
must be met to cause detonation. 
With the removal of the last two safety pins the required failures are 
reduced to three. Those three are identical to failures (1), (3), and 
(5) discussed in the predeployment phase of the mission. The reduction 
of the number of failures required to cause detonation does not 
significantly increase the hazard to the crew. 
Because the safety pins are removed before the package is placed on 
the lunar surface, MS C Safety requ ired the vendor to perform a drop 
test with the safety pins removed to insure that the mechanical timers 
do not time out or the retaining mechan isms do not fail due to the'drop 
shock. The test will be run ~n a qualification test unit following the 
completi on of other qualification 'tests. The results of this test will 
be assessed for safety impact and any potential hazard brought to the 
attention of management. 
The present deployment plan for all the explosive pac kages has been 
examined and the time line (figure 3.4-3) indicates the mission time, 
lunar surface ti me, and EVA times for deployment and mission time and 
post ascent time for the detonation of each package; This time line is 
based on the preliminary flight plan. No safety concerns have been 
identified relative to the present deployment plan. 
Based upon the number, sequence, types of failures, the limited time 
in which they mus t occur to cause premature detonation of an explosive 
package, and the characteristics of the high exp losives and end detonating 
cartridge, the LSPE is considered an acceptable risk for deployment 
on the lunar surface. 
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(I) 
Slide retaining 
me chanism failure(s ) 
0 Must occur before 
or within 4.5 
minutes after 
therma l battery 
activation 
(Failures (3) and 
(4) ) 
FAILURES WHICH MUST OCCUR AND CONDITIONS WHICH MUST BE MET 
TO CAUSE PREMATURE EP DETONATION DURING DEPLOYME NT 
(2 ) (3 ) 
Slide safety pin Thermal battery Therma 1 ba ttery 
retai ni ng me ch ani SOl .. safety pin 
failure(s) , failure 
-
Removed by astronaut 0 Must occur in 0 Must occur in 
conjunc t i on with conjuncti on wi th 
failu re (4) failure (3) 
0 Combinati on will activate t henna l 
battery 
0 Must occur after or no more than 4.5 
minu te s before the slide moves to the 
"A RM " position .. 
0 Must occur before .but within 4.5 minu~es 
of fail ure (5). 
FIGURE 4.2- 1 
(4) 
Fi ri ng ci rcui t 
failure 
0 Must occur while 
the slide is in 
the "ARW positi on 
'0 Must occur between 
.5 and 4.5 minutes 
after the thennal 
battery is 
activated. 
0 If failure occurs 
before the firing 
capacitor is 
charged the EDC 
cannot be fired. 
4.3 , Post Explosive Package Deployment 
Because explosive packages are to be deployed on each of the three 
lunar surface EVAls, there is an extended period of time that this 
mission phase will exist. As can be seen in figure 3.4-3, the 
detonation of the first explosive package will nominally be approximately 
24 hours following LM ascent. 
Between the deployme nt of the explosive packages and LM ascent the number 
of failures required to detonate an exp losive package is three. These 
trrree'-(1r e"di"5CtHrsed as faHures (:1), (3) and (5) under the prrede ploy-
ment phase of the mission. Figure 4.3-1 provides a summary of the 
failures and conditions which must be met to cause detonation. 
Because at least one of the explosive packages deployed will be passed 
on a later LRV traverse, concern was expressed on the potential hazard 
of the LRV running into or over that package. This possibility was 
evaluated and found to provide no unacceptable risk to the crew. The 
memorandum providing the rationale for that conclusion is provided in 
Appendi x B. Figure 4.3-2 indicates several possible ways in which 
the crew ~"ill deploy the Epls to insure that they are not hit on a later 
traverse. 
No unacceptable risks have been identified for the lunar surface stay 
after deployment of the explosive packages. 
As shown in the time line on figure 3.4~3, five of the eight explosive 
packages will detonate during the perind that the CSM is still in lunar 
orbit. Although there is presently no concern over the explosive package 
debris . impacting the CSM in orbit, fragmentation tests to be accomplished 
during the field testing at Wh ite Sands Test Facility ~"ill provide data 
on this subject. The test reports and data will be evaluated for 
potential hazards. Figure 4.3-3 provides the detonation time of the 
explosive packages and the position of the CSM indicated by the pre-
liminary flight plan at each of those detonation times. 
This data indicates that only two explosive packages will detonate at 
the approximate time that the CSM is over or approaching the detonation 
point. Those packages are the 1/2 pound (215:51 GET) and one 1/8 pound 
(231:10 GET). In all other cases the CSM is either on the back side of 
the moon, approaching the western terminator, or ' in transearth coast. 
Based upon the findings of th~ assessment as described in paragraphs 4.1, 
4.2 and 4.3, and the results of safety related testing. The LSPE is 
considered acceptable for inclusion in the Apollo 17 ALSEP. 
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0'1 
(IX 
Slide retaining 
mechanism failure(s) 
0 Must occur before 
or within 4.5 
minutes after 
thermal battery 
activation 
( Fa i 1 u re ( 2 ) ) 
FAILURES WHICH MUST OCCUR AND CONDITIONS WHICH MUST BE MET 
TO CAUSE PREMATURE EP DETONATION AFTER DEPLOYMENT 
{L} 
Slide safety pin . Thermal battery Thermal battery 
retaining me chanism 
. fail u re ( s ) safety pin 
Removed by astronaut o Must occur after Removed by astronaut 
or no more than 
4.5 . minutes before 
the slide moves 
to the "ARW 
position. 
o Must occur 
before but with-
in 4.5 minutes of 
failure (5) 
FIGURE 4.3-1 
.... 
(3) 
Firing circuit 
fail ure 
o Must occur while 
the slide is in the 
"ARM" position. 
o Must occur between 
.5 and 4.5 minutes 
after the thermal 
battery is activated. 
o If failure occurs 
before the firing 
capacitor is 
charged the EDC 
cannot be fired. 
POSSIBLE SCHEMES FOR AVOIDING 
.. _ _ __  ._ . __ ._ . . . ___ r_ 
CHARGE DEPLOYED ON EVA 1 
1. KEEP IN -BOUr~D TRAC KS TO ONE SID t OF OUT -BOUND TRAC KS 
INBOUND 
-n 
....... 
G1 OUTBOUND 
C 
;;0 • r 
rt1 
~ 2. ~ 
-...J W 
PLACE CHARGE ON ONE SIDE OF A RECOGNIZABLE LANDMARK; RETURN ON OPPOS'ITE SIDE 
I 
N 
\ 
3. DRIVE OFF TRACK FOR CHARGE DEPLOYMENT \ 
'\ 
CSM LOCATION AT 
LSPE EXPLOSIVE PACKAGE DETONATIONS 
DETONATION OF PACKAGE #6 
(212:01 GET)' 
(1 POUND) 
DETONATION OF PACKAGE #5 
,(214:35 GET) 
(3 POUND) 
DETONATION OF PACKAGE #7 
(215:51 GET) 
(1/2 POUND) 
DETO NAT ION OF PACKAGE #4 
(231: 10 GET) 
(1/8 POUND) 
DETONATION OF PACKAGE #1 
(236:28 GET) 
(6 POUND) 
DETONATION OF PACKAGE #8 
(239: 23 GET) 
(1/4 POUND) 
DETONATION OF PACKAGE #2 
(262:40 GET) 
(1/4 POUND) 
DETONATION OF PACKAGE #3 
(263:44 GET) 
(1/8 POUND) 
FRONT SIDE APPROACHING 
TERMINATOR -
LOS AT 212:15 
CSM ON BACK SIDE OF THE 
MOON -
AOS AT 215:00:30 
CSM ON FRONT SIDE - LUNAR SOUNDER 
OPERATION '(TRANQUILITATIS SERENITATIS 
BOUNDRy) 
CSM ON FRONT SIDE -
DETONATION ABOUT 17 MINUTES 
AFTER AOS - VEHICLE JUST PAST 
TS IOLOKOVSKY 
CS~1 ON BACK SIDE 
TEl AT 236:39:51 
AOSAT 236:46 
TRANS EARTH COAST 
TRANS EARTH COAST 
TRANSEARTH COAST 
FIGURE 4.3-3 , 
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4.4 ALSEP Central Station LSPE Astronaut Switch 
The ALSEP central station for the Apollo 16 mission had, as part of the 
Active Seismic Expe riment safety features, an astronaut switch for pro-
hibiting power application to the grenade launch assemb ly. This switch 
was maintained in the safe position until all act ivi ties down range of 
the mortar were comp l eted. When the initial design for the Array E LSPE 
was developed the 'astronaut swi tch was maintained because the details 
on the operation of the LSPE safety features ~vere not comp lete nor had 
they been proven, For the same reason the switch was to be 1 eft in the 
uOFF" positi on unt.il the end of EVA III. As the program developed the 
requirement for this switch grew less. It was determined, however, that 
the change to the central station to remove the switch provided an 
unnecessary cost and that the switch does provide a backup for working 
around some potential failures. 
The present plans now call for the central station switch to be placed 
in the "OW I position at the comp letion of ALSEP deploymen t. 
This switch wil l be left in that position only after the down link 
confirmation that the centra l station is not in the LSPE mode and that 
the return to that mode could be detected by the ground~ 
It must be pointed out that to cause the LSPE to start transmission of 
a fire code there must be two failures or two spurious signals must be 
detected by the central station receiver. One to put the central station 
on the LSPE mode and the seco nd t o cause the LS PE transmitter to begin 
transmission. 
The first of these could result from an operator error inan initiated 
ground comma nd. The second of these cannot occur as a result of operator 
error. This is true because the MSFN command to start the LSPE transmitter 
is not stored in the MSFN computer until the LM has left the lunar 
surfa ce. 
The ground will detect the initial failure and immediately transmit a 
command to remove the ALSEP from the LSPE mode. Therefore, in order 
for the LSPE transmitter to be turned on, the second spurious command 
or failure must occur with in a li mited time period before the first 
failure can be overriden by an uplink command. 
Assuming that the LSPE transmitter did begin td transmit, the exp losive 
packages could be detonated only if there were at least two failures 
within the same package. Those two failures are described as failures 
(1) and (3) in paragraph 4.1. 
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The memorandum contained in Appendix A was generated in August 
stating the Safety Office acceptance of the new procedures and 
providing the rationale for acceptance. 
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5.0 TESTING 
Because of the potentially catastrophic results of failures within the 
LSPE relative to both crew safety and experiment success, a wide variety 
of engi neeri ng and demons trat"j on type tests were performed duri ng thi s 
program. Those tests considered to be pertinent to crew safety will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs. Such tests are related to a 
(1) the mechanica l ti mers, (2) the safe/arm slide, (3) high explosive 
blo.ck environmenta l characteristics, (4) rad.io frequency interference 
effects on the explosive package, (5) integrated system operation and 
(6) the 2 mil milar dust shield. . 
As a result of these tests, it was concluded that the safety features 
incorporated into the experiment provide the desired safety margins. 
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5. 1 , Mechanical Ti mer Testing 
The timers initially designed for the LSPE and those presently used both 
have the same basic timing mechan ism as described in paragraph 3.1.3.6. 
There are differences~ however~ it has been concluded that tests run 
on the initial timing mechanism are directly re l ated to the present 
desi gn. . 
Ea~ly in the program it was di scovered that a watch in a vacuum and at 
a redu ced gravity and hi gher than normal temperature exhibited a 
.pnen.omenonknm'm as overban king. ,Qverb anking ... b&s ically i s t he result 
of the balance whee l rotat ing too far during its cycle and i mpa cting the 
back of the fork post with the fork in contact with the banking pins. 
In doing' this~ the balance whee l rebounds at a higher rate of speed and 
with greater force making the action al most sel f -perpetuat i ng . As a 
result of this action~ the watch runs faster (see figure 5.1-1). 
As part of the testing accomplished by Bendix, several sets of 
watches were tested in the zero IG I aircraft and by free fall tests at 
NASAls Lewis Research Cen t er to determine exactly v/ha t effect the reduced 
gravity would have on the wa tch mech anism. 
In conjunction with this testing, watches were run in a hi gh temperature 
vacuum conditi on ' to obtai n data on the effect on the \'/atchmechani sm. 
Although it was realized that the data gai ned separately was not as 
definitive as wo uld be the case if the lunar environment could be 
totally simulated, this da ta was used t o determine what characteristics 
the watch mechanism would be expected io demonst ra te on the lunar 
surface. 
The data demonstrated ,th at the lack of atmospheric pressure combined 
with temperatu re above l 500 F contributed most to the overbanking condition, 
and the reduced gravity the second most. It was also determined that 
if all of the conditions existed,an increase in watch speed of 
approximately 5% would result. 
This 5% decrease in run ning ti me created no safety concern but could 
result in the two ti mers in an explosive package becoming out of sync to 
a point that the package would not detonate. 
To eliminate the overbanking condition three steps were taken: 
(1) The watch mechanism was seal ed in an airtight unit and pressurized 
to 20 psia using dry nitrogen. (Leak tests are run on each timer) 
(2) The balance wheel rotation on earth was selected at a point 
which would reduce the possibility of overbanking due to the re-
duced gravity. 
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OVERBANKING COrJD ITJON 
Balance Wheel 
Escapement 
Lever 
Escape Wheel 
Overbanking is illustrated . 
. Roller jewel is shown con-
tacting escapement lever 
on "wrong" side while lever 
is restrained by banking pins . . 
Rebound of jewel off lever is 
overbanking condition. 
FIGURE 5. 1- 1 
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Banking Pins 
(3) The lubricant for the watch mechanism ~aschosen to reduce the 
high temperatu re effect on the watch mechanism. 
The detailed report on this testing is provided by the Bendix test 
report, reference 1. 
Because of the problems encountered with the timers throughout the 
program, each ti me r has been run and tested numerous times. These 
tests have included full duration and shorter ti meouts. During these 
tests there have been in excess of 100 failures on all configurationi 
of timers, but none of these have created a condition of early timeout 
·wh-;;ch··',Gou,l d be con,s i-de'red a safrety ·-·prob l em. )-\11 f ailures A·ave been such 
that the timer failed to reach its prescribed running time or the 
desired action at the end of that ti~e failed to occur. 
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5.2 Safe/Arm Slide Testing 
The major safety feature of the LSPE explosive package is the 
safe/arm slide which provides a barrier betwe en the end detonating 
cartridge and the hi gh explosive (HE) block during all but the final 
hour before package detonation (see para~raph 3.1.4.5). 
As part of the safety demonstration tests, the Naval Ordnance 
Laboratory performed vvhat is called II no fire tests.1I The purpose of these 
tests was t clei1ranstl~ate t hat "i f a~&eries ·of fa,i l ures occunr,ed ~" hi ch 
caused the EDC to detonate whi le the safe/arm slide is either in the 
IISAFE II or IIRESAFE II position,the high exp losi ve block ii/auld not detonate. 
The test was conduc te d by firing the EDC into the safe arm slide with 
the HE below. The initial series of these no fire tests was run in 
August of 1971. Twenty-six such tests were conducted without any de-
tonations occurring. The last two slides in the test series failed 
structurally; however, in neither case did the explosive block detonate. 
In those two cases, the portion of metal directly below the EDC fractured 
and a coin-shaped piece of the slide was cu t out and embedded in the HE 
block. The failed slides were from a different manufacturing lot than 
the 24 which passed the test. The failures were from a lot manufactured 
from released engineering drawings and were selected for the test 
as the initial verification of qualification and flight hardware. 
Investigation determined that the drawings used to build the final two 
slides (qualification/flight untt drawings) had an omission in the 
manufacturing requirements. The earlier units which passed the tests 
had been bui 1 t from prototype drawi ngs .and call ed for a turn radi us of 
.025 ~ .005 inches on the slide indention. The qual/flight drawings did 
not require a turn radius and were built with a 900 corner. This allowed 
a stress buildup at EDC ignition and caused the slide to fail. It was 
also determined that the failed slides had not been heat treated as 
required. 
The qualification/flight drawings were mod ified to add the radius at the 
bottom of the depression and to insure heat treat. The radius was 
increased from .025 + .005 inches to .040 + .005 inches to provide for 
better stress diffuslon. (Figure 3.1.4-4)-
Tests were run using the slides manufactured from the modified drawings 
and all were successful. 
rmL also ran tests using PETN explos ives in place of the Ht!S to demonstrate 
acceptability of the slides. PETN is ten times more sensitive to shock 
than is HNS. 
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These tests verified that the safe/arm slide does provide the desired 
safe ty margi n. In all fault trees, failure of the slide is shown, but 
is considered extremely remote. 
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5.3 High Explosjve Environmental Testing 
The Naval Ordnance Laboratory has run the thermal, vibration, and 
shock tests on the LSPE explosives. The initial series of tests, per-
formed on the prototype ha~dware consisted of acceptance vibration, 
thermal cycling, and design limit vibration, each followed by x-rays of 
the explosive block. 
During the tests a complete set of eight explos ive packages were 
attached to the transport frame as will be the case operationally. 
Investigation of the x-rays fol lowing the thermal cycling indicated 
that the explosive blocks of 1/2, 1, 3, and 6 pounds had cracked as a 
result of the tests. The smaller charges did not crack, however, the 
x-rays did indicate that the foam retainer around one of the 1/8 pound 
cha rges had shifted. 
The NOL explosive experts did not consider either of these conditions 
unaccep table for the designed mission. The following actions were taken, 
however, to insure that the safety and reliabil.ity of the experiment 
were not degraded by th is condit ion . 
(1) The remaining environmental tests (design limit vibra~ion and shock) 
were completed. 
(2) The charges were x-rayed after the vibration and shock and 
the x-rays compared with those taken after thermal cycling to deter-
mine if the cracks increased. They did not. 
(3) The cracked charges were sent to White Sands Test Facility to 
be detonated as part of .the prototype field tests. ~Jo problems 
were encountered in the field test attributable to the cracked 
charges. 
(4) A new foam type retainer was chosen for use in later explosive 
charges. 
The x-rays of the cracked charges detonated at WS TF will be used as a 
baseline for evaluating qualification explosives. 
The flight explosives will be x-rayed before assembly with the electronics. 
No cracked blocks will be flown as part of the experiment. 
During one of the mee tings held to discuss the cracking problem a question 
was raised as to the potentia l effect of HNS II dust or small pieces of 
explosives entering the slide area and becoming wedged under the slide 
prohibiting proper slide operation. 
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As a result, a proposal was made and accepted to incorporate a 2 mil 
mylar dust shield betvleen the explosive block and the base plate to 
prohibit such conditions. Paragraph 5. 5 describes a test performed to 
demonstrate this modification. The mylar shield has not been used 
in any of the prototype field tests but will be a part of the 
qualification configuration. 
Tests pertinent to the safety of the high explosives have been run at 
various times by the Naval Ordnance Laboratory. References 7 through 9 
provide reports on some of those tests. 
There have been no safety related probl~ms encountered during the LSPE 
explosive block environmental testi~g. 
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5.4 Explosive Package EED/RFI Testing 
A series of tests have been run at the MSC anechoic chamber for the 
purpose of demonstrating that the predicted RFI during testing and use 
of the LSPE explosi ve package provi de no hazard to the crew or ground 
personnel. After . an evaluation of the potential RFI environments 
during all phases of t esting and the Apollo 17 mission, it was determined 
that the most critical conditions are during the use of the Apollo 
initiator resi stance measuring equipment (AIRME) · for bridgewire resist-
ance t ests, stowage at KSC , 'dur i ng depl oyment ' on th e ·1 tlnar surface, 
and followi ng deployment. 
The RFI environment was simulated for each of these periods with the 
test levels 10 db or more above that expected. 
The test was completed on October 14, 1971 and demonstrated that the 
EP design has a safe margin for i mmunity from stray RF. The complete 
report of this test is provided in reference 3. 
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5.5 2 Mil My lar Dust Shield Testing 
During the Configuration Control Board reyiew of the proposal for the 
addition of the dust shield between the explosive block and the safe/arm 
slide, con cern was expressed oyer the effect of a delta pressure tearing 
the mylar or pushing i t into the slide, th~reby prohibiting proper 
operation. As a result of this concern, an evaluation test wa s run as 
follows: 
P.. ·:fhete-s t fixtu·re , . was'·.ass8mb led a·s i·ndica-ted in fi.gure 5.5-1. 
B. The test fi xture was pressurized t6 14.5 psid and that pressure 
maintained for 3 minutes. . 
C. The pressure was increased at a rate of .2 psid per second to 
50 ps i d. 
D. The 50 psid pressure was maintained for 5 minutes, after which time 
the pressure was relieved. 
Observati ons 
A. The 2 mil myl ar di d not -rupture at pressures up to 50 ps i d. 
B. Slight ballooning of the mylar occurred at 14.5 psid. 
C. Additional ballooning of the mylar occurred at 50 psid. 
Conclusions 
A. The 2 mil mylar dust shield will not rupture at any foreseeable 
pressure differential between the EP electronics and explosive block 
conta i ner. 
B. The ballooning observed at 14.5 psid will not interfere with the 
explosive package safe/arm slide. 
C. Because the exp losive package is not hermetically sealed and the 
time from lift off to slide activation will be approximately 200 
hours, any delta pressure between the two halves of the exp losive 
package will be relieved before the package will be required to 
arm. 
The dust shield was not included in any of the prototype 
explosive packages tested at WSTF but will be part of the 
qualification test configuration. 
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5.6 Field Tests 
The LSPE field tests were developed to perfonn systems level tests on 
the proto type and qu alification configuration of the explosive pack ages 
and transmi tte r. The t ests are presently in progress at White Sands 
Test Facility (vISTF). The MSC Safety Office was assigned the 
responsibility for test program safety and has therefore reviewed all 
test procedures, test set up and precautions to be taken. Appendix C 
contains the area control plan prepared by ~1SC Safety defining safety 
guidelines for the testing. 
The initial test series began in January 1972. This series utilized 
the preliminary timer design which had been modified to reduce problems 
encountered earlier. Because of these timer problems several complete 
successful timer runouts were required before the timers were accepted 
for use in the test program. The final runout is accomp lished at WSTF 
before the explosive block is attached. This is accomp lished to reduce 
the possibility of a dud package requiring potentially hazardous re-
covery or destruction activities. 
During the initial series of tests, five packages were deployed and 
detonated with no problems noted. 
The second series of tests was started in April 1971 following additional 
timer modifications. During this series four explosive packages were 
deployed similar to the operational plan at t.hat time. Two of these 
packages failed to detonate, the other two were successful. (The failures 
occurred in 1/8 pound and 6 pound packages) 
Per the safety guidelines, the dud packages safe/arm slides and firing 
pulse detectors were observed and determined to be in the condition 
acceptable for recovery. Failure analysis of these two duds revealed 
that the thermal battery timer had stopped in both packages. I none 
package the timer had restarted and the thermal battery had been 
activated. Because of this, there was some concern that the RF link 
between the transmitter and the deployment location for the package that 
had the timer restart was not adequate. A series of RF tests were run 
and the adequacy of the link was confirmed. 
As a result of these and other timers failures, a.new timer design was 
selected for the explosive packages with a series of tests using these 
timers starting in September 1972. During these tests, two packages 
were sent to WSTF. One package experienced failures of both timers 
during the preassemb ly time out. The other package functioned properly 
and was deployed. This package, however, failed to detonate. Upon 
i nspecti on it was determi ned that the safety gui de 1 i nes for a 11 owi ng 
recovery were met and the package was recovered. The inspection of that 
package i ndi cated that the thermal battery timer had either not started 
or had run less than five minutes. 
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Subsequent to · these failures,modifications were made to the direct 
drive ti mer and the tests resumed. The first package with the modified 
direct drive t imer (1/4 pound) was depl oyed on Se ptemb er 28 and 
successfully detonated on October 2. Two additional packages (6 pound 
and 1/8 pound) were deployed on October 6 and detonated on October 10. 
As a part of the WSTF testing, data on EP fragmentation is being obtained. 
This is accomp lished by use of Styrafoam lined fiberglass dome s over three 
of the smaller packages. Two of these dome s included instrumentation 
allowing determination of fra gmen t velocity as well as pattern. The 
pu rpose of these te sts is t o determi ne if the probab ili'ty of potential 
damage to the ALSEP central station is sufficiently high to require 
eli mination of the sma ll er close-in charges . The report on these tests 
wil l be avail ab l e in l ate October or early November. The reports will 
be evaluated by safety and an addend ul11 to this · report prepared to pro-
vide safety, reliability, and quality assurance recommendations. 
To date, no problems have been encountered at WSTF related to either 
test personnel or flight crew safety. 
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6.0 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
This section presents, in a logic form, all combinations of LSPE 
malfunctions which could cause premature detonation of any exp)osive 
pack age . 
Figure 6.0-1 pages 66 through 71 provide a detailed fault tree for 
the entire LSPE. Simp lifi ed trees for each mission phase indicating -
only th e worst case failures are provided in figures 6.0-2, 6.0-3 and 
6.0-4 . 
The symb ols used in the fault trees are-explained on the following sheet. 
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APPENbIX A 
Memorandum SN-8-72- l85 dated August 23, 1972 
ALSEP (Apollo Lunar Surface Expe ri me nt Package) Central Station 
LSPE (Lunar Seismic Profilin~E xperi ment) Astronaut Switch 
NA/Director, Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance 
To: PA/Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program 
A-l 
REPLY TO 
NATIONAL AERONt\UTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 
Jvll';i~~ SPflCEC RA FT CE NTER 
RI=Ct.ly~U 
- r:LJUSTO~I. TE XAS 77058 
AUG £3 2 54 PH '7' 
ATTN OF: SN-8-72-185 
. AUG 2 3 1972 
MEM::lRANDUM 
TO: 
FROM: 
SUBJECT: 
PA/Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program 
NA/ Director, Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance 
ALSEP (Apollo Lunar Surface Experiments Package) Central 
Station LSPE (Lunar Seismic Profiling Experiment) Astronaut 
Switch 
It has been brought to the attention of the Safety Office that during ' 
the July 20, 1972, crew training exercise at KSC, the crew cuff check-
lists called for activation. of the LSPE astronaut s'..,itch on the central 
station during EVA I f ollo;.·Ting ALSEP deplo:yment. · Acti vatlon of this 
svritch caused some question re l ated to safety . The subject switch is 
located on the central station and was originally provided t o inhibit 
the fire cotmnand output for the active seismic experiment. Early in the 
desi gn phase of the Array E program , it was determined that the switch 
should be left on t he central station as a backup safety feature . 
The original plans for lunar surface operations had the crew activat i ng 
the switch near the end of EVA 3. This was not desirable since an early 
termination of l unar stay would have left the ce~tral station configured 
such that the LSPE could not be commanded from the ground :.eaving no 
chance to get data from the experiment. This resulted in the Safety 
Office being asked to evaluate the possibility of activating the switch 
during EVA I after ALSEP deploYl';;ent. . 
The Safety Office reviewed the procedure looking specifically at the 
safety features remaining after act i vation of the switch . Our analysis 
determi ned that the position of the sHi tch would not be critical to cre .. ., 
safety contingent upon verification that the central station is not in 
the LSPE mode and that the dmrn link data will indicate if and "Then the 
central station enters the LSPE mode. 
The safety features present after the switch has been act i vated would 
require the follOl-Ting failures to occur before any hazardous situation 
could exist . 
a. The central station must go to the LSPE mode either because 
of a failure in the central station or the receipt of a command to enter 
LSPE mode. 
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b. The central station must go t o the LSPE transmit mode because 
of a failure i n the central station or the receipt of a command to enter 
LSPE transmit mode . 
c. The explosive package safe/arm sli de t i mer or t i mer assembl y 
must fai l and allow the slide t o move t o the arm position . This must 
occur so that the s l ide is in that position when the fa ilures discussed 
in (b ) and Cd) occur if the package is to detonate. 
d. The explosive package thermal battery timer or timer 
assembly must fai l and all 0\-1 the firing pin to strike the thermal battery 
after or concurrent "lith the fai l ures in (b) and ( c) above . I f this 
f ai l ure occurs more than three minutes before the other failures dis-
cus sed, the thermal battery i-lil l become exhausted and the explos i ve 
pa ckage RF receiver ,·muld be incapab le of detecting a f ire com .. rnand to 
i gni te the end detonating cartridge. 
The timers and timer assembli es discussed in (c) and Cd) are completely 
independent units and i'lOuld not be inf luenced by failures in the central 
station . 
Based on the above data the Safety Office concluded that the procedure 
change was highly desirable and. that the reduct ion in crew safety was 
not s i gnificant • 
.£V;~6.. ___ ~. /J&--( 
M. L. Raines 
cc: 
NASA Hqs ., H. J. Hilloughby, 1vlAQ 
NASA Hqs. , LQ J. Casey, M~ 
AC/G. H. S . Abbey 
CA/D. K. Sl ayton 
CA/T. P. Stafford 
CB/Ao B. Shepard 
CG/J . WQ Bi l odeau 
CG3!D. C. Schultz 
CG3/D. A. Bland 
EA/M. A. Faget 
ED/E. M. Jones 
ED/ D. G. Hiseman 
ED2/P. D. Gerke 
ED2/E 0 L. I-reeks 
FA/H. Ttl . Tindall 
SN/ BJMiller:sb: 8/18/ 72 : 2901 
A-3 
FC/E. F o Kranz 
FC9/J . E. Saultz 
FC9/R. Ho Koos 
NA/I,!. M. Bl and 
NA/E. M. Fields 
NB/J. H. Levine 
NB5/E. K. Smi th 
ND/J . A. Jones 
PA/ S. H. Simpk i nson 
PA!R. H. Kubicki 
PD/R. V. Battey 
PD4/J. R. Seiver 
FG!J. F. Goree 
SN/C. N. Rice 
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~PPENDIX B 
Memorandum SN-8- 72-1 BO dated August 7, 1972. 
LSPE (Lun ar Seismic Profiling Experiment) Explosive Package Deployment 
and Subsequent LRV (Lunar Roving Vehicle) Traverses 
NA/Director, Safety Reliability, and Quality Assurance 
To: PA/Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program 
B-1 
RECEIVED 
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMiNISTRATION 
MANNED SPACECRAFT CENTER 
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058 
L 24 PH '72 
AUG 7 1972 
REPLY TO 
ATTN OF: SN-8-72-180 
MEMORANDUM 
1\): PA/}ffinager, Apollo Spacecraft Program 
FROM: NA/Director, Safety, Reliability , and Quality Assurance 
SUBJECT: 'LSPE (Lunar Seismic Profiling Experiment) Explosive 
Package Deployment and Subsequent LRV'(Lunar Roving 
Vehicle ) Traverses 
In response to an action received at the Apollo 17 Mission Revie'\-l on 
July 19, 1972, vrhere NASA Headquarters expressed a concern ,-lith re-
spect to the L...'RV r unning ove r LSPE explosive packages deployed on 
earlier traverses, th·~ following actions vrere taken by the ,;vISC Safety 
Office: 
a. Mr . Gene Kilmer of the NOL (Naval Ordnance Laborato::-y ) "las 
contacted, and con..i'irma tion of the HNS II i nsensitivity to shock was 
obtained . The informat ion obtained verified that the LSPE explosive 
block is insensitive to any shock Hhich can be generated during trans -
portation 0::- by LRV impact vli th an explosive package . The fo lloHing 
examples .are provided : 
(1 ) Pure mTS II (more sensitive than the HHS/teflon used in 
LSPE ) Has impacted by a 20 ~~ . shell and failed to detonate . 
(2 ) NOL hard,·mre containing mrs II ,-las dropped from a height 
of 40 feet and the explosives did not detonate . The hardware Has dis -
ass embled , the explosive examined, and then purposely detonated to 
determine any change in detonat ion velocity. No change vlas noted . 
NOL estimates that during the 40- foot drop the explosive received 
20,000 G'S on impact . 
(3) One of the LSPE explosive blocks vlaS dropped at NOL 
fr om a height of 4 feet . A corner Ivas broken off , but the block did 
not detonate. 
( 4 ) During HOL no- fire tests aoo confirmation of the safe/ 
arm slide, several slides with manufacturing defects Here coined out 
by the end detonating cartridge . The coin from the slide vlaS embedded 
in the explosive block whi ch did not detonate . 
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b. A revie"l of the potential failures "'hich could cause the pre-
mature detonation 0:( an LSPE explosive package was accomplished . These 
failures .. Tere evaluated relative to the effect of the LRV running over 
or into the package . The following is pertinent to t his eva luation : 
(1) Three selective failures must occur i n order to cause 
detonation: 
(a) Mechanical fa ilure of the safe/arm slide retalnlng 
'pin ; the 'retaining pin/ti:n~er j.nte'rface arm , or ,·-the timer such that the 
timer has prematurely run out to the arm ,pos ition only . 
' (b) Mechanical failure of the thermal battery firing 
pin reta iner, the r eta iner/timer interface arm, or the timer such that 
the timer has prematurely run out. 
(c) Failure of the SCR ( silicon control rect i fier ) firing 
circuit after the thermal battery has fired and the firing pulse capaci-
tor has charged . 
(2) The failure of the i tems listed in (l)(a) above mus t occur 
in a certain manner before the_detonation is possible . 
( a ) The f ailure of the safe/arm slide retaining pin , which 
is a 440 stainless stee l pin 1/8" in diameter , must occur bet\'leen the 
slide and the timer housing through which the pin passes . If the failu.re 
occu.rs \ 'l i thin the housing or in the width of the slide , the slide .. rill 
not move to the arm position . 
(b) Failure of the safe/arm slide retaining pi n/timer 
interface arm must occur in a manner that the resafe portion of t ha t 
interface arm is not damaged . If that portion of the arm is also broken, 
the slide will move from the safe position directly into the resafe po-
sition prohibiting firing of the end detonating cartridge . 
(c) Premature runout of the timer must occu.r instanta-
neously and must advance the time r to t he arm runout time and stop 
before the r esafe runout time is reached. The distance between the 
arm and resafe position of the timer drum is approximately 1/16" . 
(3) The failures described in ( l )( b ) above must occur so 
as to have the thermal battery firing pin impact the thermal battery 
instantaneously, if the explosive package i s to detonate as a result 
of all the failure s discussed in paragraph b . 
(L}) The failure of the firing circui t can be expanded to 
include a failure wit hi n the decoder cau,s ing the explos ive package 
to react as though an authent ic fire cownand had been received . In 
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order for this to cause detonation of t he package, it must occur vrithin 
a l imited time period based on the failures in b(l)(a) and b(l)(b ) . The 
failure in the SCR circuitry must occur after the thermal battery has 
fired and has charged the firing capacitor, and after the safe/arm slide 
has moved to the arm posit i Dn removing t he short from the end detonating 
cartridge. If the failure occurs before the ~apacitor is charged or the 
slide is moved to arm , the current will flow directly to the end deto-
nating cartridge without sufficient current to cause detonation or will 
short around the cartridge. I f, however, the failures occur more than 
3 mirtut e s ai'ter thE: ' t ollerma l ba ttery has fir ed, ,t he battery will ha ve 
exhausted its capability and t he firing capacitor charge,vill have 
drained off through a bleed- dmv" n circuit. If the failure occurs before 
the battery is exhausted but after the slide has moved to the resafe 
position, the end detona ting cartridge is aga in shorted and cannot be 
detonated . 
c . Discussions vrere held Hi th the Operations Analysis Branch 
(PD4 ) personnel. The procedures ,'Till be prepared so as to provide 
assurance that the packages ,vill not be run over by t he LRV . 
According to the present traverse plans . only one explosive package l°rill 
be deployed in a position where the potential of LRV impact on subse -
quent traverses vTill exis t . The exact method of i nsuring no impact is 
not firm. Several methods have been discussed including : 
( 1 ) Driving the LRV i n a circle 3600 around the deployed 
package outlining an area into vrhich the vehicle is not to enter on 
subsequent traverses. 
( 2 ) Driving the LRV perpendicular (s~uth) to the direct p~th 
back to t he LM for 'an adequate distance before deployment of the pack-
age then r eturn to the original pa th and'c ontinue to the LM . On sub -
sequent traverse over this route the LRV would rema in on the tracks 
l eading directly back to t he n·1 or north of tha t path . 
(3) On subsequent traverses the Capcomm will warn the crew 
when they a r e entering the general area of the previously deployed 
explosive package. 
The method of insuring tha t the explosive package s will not be hit 
by the h"RV will be revie\v"ed by the Safety Office . Safety ivill verify 
that it is included in the lunar ~urface procedures , and t ha t the 
Capcorrun note for Harning the cre,'r is included in the procedures . During 
the mission the Safe ty Office f!:ission monitors will i nsure t hat any 
changes in lunar surface activities do not result in umrarned entrance 
i nto an area ,vhere LRV explosive package impact could occur. 
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It must be stressed that impact of the r.....1:tV YTith an LSPE expl os ive 
package is not considered a hazard based upon the above information. 
The procedural· eff ort is an addit i ona l safety precaution as Hell as 
insurance aga i nst loss of L8PE data as a result of damage to an 
explosive package whic h vlOuld cause the package not to detonate as 
planned. 
The informat i on c onta ined in this memora~dwn Has discussed \-lith Mr. 
H. J. Hi·l loughby" l'I;iSA H@ 2.a.que r ters . Hr . Hilloughby r.e quested a 
copy of the pe rtinent sheets from the procedures uRon their release. 
~--~ /~~~~~'--?-------
M. L. Raines 
cc: 
NASA. Hqs., \IT . J. Vlilloughby, MAQ 
NASA Hqs., L. J. Casey , MAE 
AC/G. W. S . Abbey 
CA/D. K. Slayton 
CAITI'. P. Staffcrd. 
CB/ A. B. Shepa rd 
EA/M. Fage t 
EA22/R. P. Burt 
ED/E. M. Jones 
ED/D. G. Hiseman 
ED2/P. D. Ger ke 
ED2/E. L. \'leeks 
FA/ H. "H. Tindall 
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1. 0 INTRODUCTION 
1. 1 PURPOSE· 
ThIS document defines the area control which '.vill be enforced during 
the Luna r S eismi c Profiling Experiment (LSPE) Explosive Package 
(EP) Field Tests at White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). 
1.2 SCOPE 
The controls d e scribed herein cover all LSPE test areas and test 
conditions for both the prototype and qualification t esting. Deviations 
from these controls must be by approved Test Prepa ration Sheets 
and/ or Safety Wa i vers . 
2.0 SITE DESCRIPTION 
The main area for the LSPE testing at WSTF is defined as the 700 
area in which ·is located the Instrum entation building, EP Ass em bl y 
trailer, High Explosive (HE) Storage building, LSPE Geophone array 
site and HE Deployment sites. Other than the 700 area, LSPE work 
wil l be done at both the 200 area and building 101. In the 200 area , 
a screen room will be used for elec~ronicand safe / arm assembly 
(E &SA ) and mechanical timer che ckout. }\n. illustration of the WSTF 
area is provided in figure 1. 
As shown in figure '1, the HE Storage building and EP Assembly trailer 
have b een placed a safe distanc e from other inhabited areas. The 
Calibration Char ge and EP Deployment sites have been selected based. 
upon r equirements for personne l safety and test data acquisition . These 
deploym ent sites vary in distance from the Instrum enta tion building 
from approximately 800 feet up to approximately 11,000 feet. 
Within the WSTF the re are numerous grave l r .oads. Seve ral of thes e 
roads run near the EP Deployment sites as indicated in figure 1 . 
These roads w ill be provided with road blocks during periods when 
hazardous activity is in process . 
3.0 AREA CONTROL 
3. 1 GENERAL 
General access to the LSPE test areas described earlier will be 
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controlled ·by the Master Access list contained in Appendix A to 
this document. Additions or modifications to this list can be made 
by th e MSC Test Director. Any modification to th e three man limit 
for acti vities involving explosives handling during the prototype 
testing will be considered a major safety devi a tion as defined in the 
memorandum from IVI . L. Raines to PA /lVlanager, Apollo Spacecraft 
Program contained in Appendix B of this document. 
3. 2 .HIGH EXPL.oSIVE STOHAGE A HEA 
The liigh Explosive (HE) used in this testing, both the HNSII blocks 
for the LSPE EP's and the T~T calibration charge, will be stored in 
a small storage building located a distance· from the EP Assembly 
trail er off of road G as indicat e d in figure 1. 
The road l eading to the storage building will be blocked at all times 
with a bilingual (English and SpanLsh ) \\'arnin g sign on the road block. 
Warning si.gns are attached to the building itself and posted at several 
locations around the building. 
As discussed in the access li st (Appendi x A), no more than thre e 
individua.ls, at anyone time, shall approach the storage building 
close r than the road block. In no event shall individuals approach 
the building unless accompanied by.NavalOrdnance Laboratory 
personnel. In all cases activity in the storage area will be by the 
buddy system. There will a l ways be a minimum of two persons for 
any activity in this area. 
3.3 E:ATLOSIVE PACKAGE/CA LIBRATION CHARGE PREPARATION 
The EP Assembly trailer as been specially grounded and equipped for 
assembling the LSPE EP's. This trailer will a lso be used to prepare 
the explosive charge for calibration of the LSPE geophone and 
test equipment. 
At any t im e that explosives are removed from the storage building 
and taken to the Assembly trailer for charge preparation, road G will 
be blocked at the points Band C deSignated in figure 1. 
Prior to removing any explosives from the storage building, WSTF 
Security will be notified that acti vities involving explosives will be 
in process at the 700 area and road G will be blocked. After notification 
of security and set up of road blocks the assembly trailer personnel 
will be notified to proceed. 
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At the time the explosives are remove d from th e storage building 
and transport e d to the Asse mbly trailer, a red flag will be rais e d on 
the trailer. Thls flag will be maintained in the raised position until 
the explosives are removed from the trailer either for return to the 
storage building or deployed in the deployment area. 
There will be no more than three individuals in the secured area 
during explosive handling acti vities . These individuals will be 
two .NOL p.erSDPneL.(or cone NOL,.per.sonnel and one IVISC personnel), 
and one additional as specified by the l\1SC Test Director. 
3.4 EXPLOSIVE PACKAGE AND CALIBRATION CHARGE DEPLOY1\lENT / 
POST DEPLO\'1\IEN T 
The high explosi ves, calibration charge and LSPE EP's, will be 
deployed in the areas approximated in figure 1. The explosi ves 
will be transported fr om the storage building 0.1' assembly trailer 
to the d eployment sites in a jeep type vehicle. The explosives will 
be contained in an ammunition case using foam rubber for shock 
attenuation. The vehicle yvill have a red flag mounted whenever 
explosives are being transported~ 
3.4.1· CALIBRATION CHARGE DEPLOY~\IENT /POST DEPLOYl\,IENT 
Prior to removing the calibration charge from the storage building 
or the Assembly trailer for deployment, security and the test personnel 
in Material Compatibility test area win be notified of the start of 
explosive handling activities. 
The personnel v/ithin the LSPE Instrumentation trailer and the 
Material Compatibility testing trailer will b e directed to remain in 
their location and to refrain from any RF transmission until notified. 
Road blocks will be in place at points Band D on figure 1. The 
explosive will then be taken by jeep , to a point on the graded road 
leading to the 1/8 pound EP deployment site. The road block at 
point D will be lifted as soon as the vehicle has been parked . 
Prior to deploying the explosives the readiness of the test equipment 
will be confirmed. The explosive charge will be deployed at the pre-
determined sand bagged site and the firing leads laid out around the 
.C-7 
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geophonc array to the instrumentation trailer . 
at its parked location until after detonation. 
The vehicle will remain 
Just prior to d eton'at ion of the cahrge security and any personnel in 
the Material Compatibility test trailer will be informed of the' 
approximate time that the charge will be detonated. 
Personne l within the .Ins.trumentation buildiT.').g \v,ill ,l. imited to twelve as 
indicated in the Master Access list (Appendix A). 
The char ge will be detonated from the Instl:umenta tion building by 
NOL personnel. Following detonation the NOL personnel will inspect 
the deploy rnent area to condirm that no und etonated raw expl osives ex ist. 
Subsequent to the inspection all road blocks will be removed and all 
areas notified of the end of the test sequence . 
3.4.2 EXPLOSIVE PACKAGE DEPLOYMEN T /POST DEPLOYMENT 
Prior to remo ving the LSPE explosive package (s) from the storage 
building or the ass embly trailer for deployment, security and the 
test personne l in the material compatib ility test area will be notified 
, of the start of explosive handling activities . 
The personnel within the LSPE instrum.entatibn building and the material 
compatibility test trailer will be directed to remain in the trailer and 
to refrain frorn any RF trans mis s i<;>n until notifi ed. Prior to beginning 
deployment of the EP (s)' unde r the instrumented fragmentation dome (s), 
all power to the instrume ntation shall be verified , I OFF". The ins-
trumenta tion shall remain "OFF" until afte r the deployn"E nt team has 
ret urned to the LSPE trailer. 
Road blocks will set up at points B, D, G, and H for the deployment 
of the explosive packages. 
... During the deployment team's return trip from the de'ployment site 
they, will set up road block F. 
After the appropriate road blocks have been varified the Ep1s will 
be taken by jeep type vehicle to their perd e termined deployment sites. 
The deployment team w ill consist of no nlOre than three individuals, 
two NOL personne l (or one NOL personnel and one MSC personnel) 
and one additional individ'uals as specified in the Master Access list, 
Appendix A. 
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.and material compatibility testing trailer so notified and allowed to 
leave their area. RF transmission will remain restricted until the 
compl etion of the d eployment sequ e nce. 
From this point until the EP' s are detonat e d ro a d blocks F, G, and H 
will be retained. Each of th e road bloc ks m e ntion ed wi ll have warning 
signs attached. 
Durin g the 90+ hours b e tween deployment and ,detonation p e riods visual 
check s will be made of the r es tricted ar e a'to 'insure no individual enters 
the hazardous area and that the EP has not been Over turned. 
Just prior to the be g innin g to the transmission of the fire comn-land from 
the LSPE transmi tte r, security will be notifi e d that the test is in process 
and the approximate time of EP detonation. 
Access to the 700 Area during the EP detonation period is controlled by 
the Master Acc e s;; list, App e ndix A. 
Follow in g deton a tion ( s ) NOL personnel wi ll inspect the detonation site (s) 
to in sure that no unde tonated raw explosives exist. At th'e cornpletion of 
this inspection, the road blocks will be lifte~. 
3.5 EXPLOSIVE PA CKAGE DUD RECOVER/DESTRUCTION 
As part of the LSPE Fie ld T e st Safety Plan (r efe r e nce 1), a backout 
plan was pr epar e d in the form of a decision 10 g ic flow to cov e r th e 
possibility of a dud :2P. Dud packag e s which In v e the safe/arm slide 
in the resafe position and firing pulse d e t e ctor (flush bulb) not fired 
may be recover e d. If the slide is in any po s ition other than resafe Or 
if the flash bulb h3.. s fired th e package shall b e destroyed. In the event 
of a dud packag e the r oa d blocks in us e durin g th e timer run out period 
will be kept in place until the packa ge is e ither r e covered Or destroyed. 
All oper a tions involved in dud recovery includin g the viewin g of the safe 
indicator and firin g pulse d ete ct<?r will be by TPS. 
Observation of the safe /arnl slide positi on for dud packages not under 
the fra gmentation dome shall be accompli s h ed by spotting scope from a 
safe distance. Obs e rvation of the slide position fo r dud p a cka ge s under 
a fr agmentat ion dome sha ll be nO sooner than 2 4 hour s after nominal 
detonation time. BeIor e p e r sonnel approache s th e instrumented dome 
all pow e r must b e remo v ed from the ins trum e nta tion. 
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Destruction of the char ge will be accomplished by NOL per sonnel 
at the EP d eployment site . Durin g this activity two and only two 
individuals will e nt e r the r e stricte d area. 
by a team of 
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Recovery of a dud char ge will a lso be accompli she d 
two individu a ls at leas t on e of w hich is from NOL. 
ass ern.bly of the package wi ll be accomplishe d at the 
Dis -
deploym.ent site. 
Follow in g disassembly, the explosive block will be returned to the 
e:x:plo'sivestor'age building an d the E & SA rdurned to tn e 200 Area 
screen roonl. 
Restrictions in effect for all areas l eading up to nornlal EP detonation 
will be enforc ed dur ing th e l' ecovery Or de struction of any dud EP. 
4.0 SAFETY BRIEFINGS 
In order to inhance the safe ty of per sonnel involved in th e LSPE Field 
Tes t (par ticipants , 0 bserver sand WSTF . servic e peJ;" sonnel), · safety 
bri e fin gs on the experiment s, explosives and other WSTF tests running ' 
COncurr ently ar e r equir. cd. 
4.1 LSPE SAFETY BRIEFINGS 
All LSPE Field Te st per sonnel, participants, or 0 bs erver s not know-
1edgabl e in the details of the experiment will b e given a briefing on 
the working and potential hazards of the explosive packages. This 
briefing will also includ~ a review of the test site and area control 
for each test phase. 
Briefin g of the WSTF Safety and WSTF Fire Department will also be 
accomplished i n order to acquaint these individuals with the LSPE 
and its field t es ting. 
The test per sonnel involve d with the materi~l compatibility testing 
being accompl ishe d concurrently with the LSPE testing will be 
briefe.d On the experiment and precautions taken during the test program. 
4.2 MA TERIAL COMPA TIBILIT Y TESTING 
Concurrent with the LSPE testing, Material Compatib ility testing 
involvin g propellant is being accomplished in th e 700 Area' (see figure 1). 
Because of th e potential haz a rd of such testing and its near proximity 
to the LSPE test area, all LSPE t e st personnel that ,vill be in the 
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700 area must be" briefed on the t es tin g and precautionary actions 
to be taken in the event of an accident. 
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This briefing shall be at t ende d before entry into the 700 Area is allowed. 
5.0 REFEREN CES 
1. LSP Fie ld Test Safety Plan ALSEP-LS-ll Rev. A Dat ed 11/2 4 /71. 
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REPLY TO 
ATTN OF: 
N..A.TIO['\AL AERC~AU TI CS AND SP ACE AD MIN ISTRf'.TION 
M AN ~C~ SP~CECRAFT CENT ER 
HO US H ,:! TE XAS 77 053 · 
NS-10-72-207 {)JOV 3 1972 
TO: NASA Headquarters 
Attn: MA IApoll o Program Director 
FROM: PA/Manager, Apollo Spacecraft Program 
Assessment Re ort for the LSPE (Lunar Seismic 
Profiling Experirr.ent 
The VS C System Safety Office has a ccomplished an i ndependent safety 
assessment of the LSPE for Apoll o 1 7 . The report of that assessment 
i s encl osed and provides a bri ef description of the LSPE and its sub-
sys tems . It specifically addresses the safety fea t ures des i gned i nto 
the exper i ment to provide the necessary confidence that the cre'·l I'J ill 
not be exposed to any unacceptable hazards during t he j~pollo 17 mission . 
The report a l so briefl~r discusses +he test:i.ng wrj eh has been ac comr,l ished 
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fragmentation dom::: tests "Jill be r evievled by MSC Safety, Reliabili ty , 
and Quality Assurance ""hen avail abl e . The conclusions and r ecorr.menc.a-
tions f r om that evaluation "li11 be provided in Rn addendum to the ~ ' 11bj e c t 
r eport . 
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